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THE FINANCIAL CRISIS OF 2008 HAS PERMANENTLY changed Wall
Street. Conventional wisdom says that Wall Street-the "bad guy" in
the simple narrative---enabled the crisis by providing the financial
technology, primarily securitization and derivatives, that brought the
global financial system to its knees. I don't disagree, except to suggest
that there is nothing intrinsically wrong with these financial instru-
ments. But I take a slightly different perspective on the relationship
between Wall Street and the crisis. With the caveat that in hindsight
we are all an Einstein or a Buffett, I posit that one of the root causes
of the crisis (and there are many) is the way Wall Street organized itself
during the 1990s and beyond.
During this period, Wall Street was consolidating at an aggressive
pace. The consumption of firms was startling. Consider these venerable
names from the not so distant past: Alex. Brown, Bankers Trust, SG
Warburg, Donaldson Lufkin & Jenrette, Montgomery Securities,
First Boston, JP Morgan, Salomon Brothers, Smith Barney, Paine
Webber, just to name a few. Many of these firms were consumed by
commercial banks, which had enormous balance sheets but lacked
the intellectual capital and operational scale to break into the top-tier
of investment banking. These banks included Deutche Bank, UBS,
Credit Suisse, Swiss Bank, Barclays, Bank of America, Chase Manhattan,
and the predecessors of Citigroup. These firms brought an enormous
amount of new capital to the activity of investment banking.
Like most financial executives, I accepted the idea that global finance
required intense concentration of capital and a global network of
intellectual capital and cross-selling capabilities within a single firm
structure. I was wrong. And so too were the titans of Wall Street who
engineered this mega-catastrophe. The consolidation combined stable
commercial banking with volatile investment banking. The invest-
ment banking business now had far more capital. During this time as
well, vast pools of private capital, private equity, and hedge funds also
came into prominence and were searching for returns. With the con-
vergence of these factors, Wall Street was primed to take larger risks.
In hindsight, as I try to make sense of what is happening now, my
moment of insight should have been a valuation study I performed
for a large financial institution. The question concerned the value of a
large fixed income trading operation. There were no comparable public
companies, and so no easy answer to the question. The work required
an implied sum-of-the-parts analysis of bulge bracket (full service)
investment banks. The study's essential conclusion was that propri-
etary trading operations, the rype of activiry that is at the epicenter of
this crisis, are and should be lowly valued. Even then, this made intuitive
sense: Such activity requires large amounts of capital and is highly
risky, thus necessarily resulting in low valuations.
When investment banks were independent, capital was precious
and judiciously applied. True, Wall Street is littered with firms that
self-destructed as a result of poor risk management. But notable
accidents and malfeasances aside, the risks of proprietary trading
were contained by an appreciation of risks that could blowout one's
capital. This fear instilled discipline. In the past, Wall Street had
focused on high value, high return activities-some of which such as
mergers and acquisitions advisory require little capital.
The balance radically changed when Wall Street consolidated in
the 1990s. Firms were getting larger, fueled by an occasional shot of
anti-regulatory steroids. A landmark event was the conversion of
Goldman Sachs from a partnership to a public company. The logic is
JD 2009 34
apparent: bigger meant more capital; more capital required greater
returns; greater returns are achieved only with greater risk. There are
only so many highly profitable, lower risk opportunities to go
around. Where would the returns come from? The banks had to take
bigger risks, and this meant that the focus would turn to trading-
that lowly valued, highly risky business, which was "juiced up" with
high leverage to yield greater profits. Just as there was a global credit
bubble that fueled the housing bubble, there was a glut of capital on
Wall Street, with commercial banks, investment banks and private
capital all searching for returns. The resulting financial pressures
transformed Wall Street from a value-added, intermediation service
provider to an enormous hedge fund.
The organizational changes on Wall Street left it highly vulnerable
to a seismic shift in market volatility, just the way a decade before
Long- Term Capital Management was vulnerable to the abnormal
disturbance in the fixed income market triggered by the Russian debt
default crisis. This time around, in the wake of the housing crash and
credit illiquidity, it is no surprise that the first casualties were the
independent investment banks that did not have the capital to with-
stand a catastrophic shock: Bear Stearns, Merrill Lynch, and Lehman
Brothers. These firms did not have the balance sheets to survive a
financial shock, or at least to delay an ultimate demise. I would never
have thought that in one fell swoop, these firms would go the way of
the dinosaur. Nor could we have foreseen that Goldman Sachs and
Morgan Stanley, the two surviving patricians of American investment
banking, would be forced to convert to banking holding companies.
So what is the
future of invest-
ment banking?
Any answer is
speculative. We
know that finan-
cial institutions
cannot be allowed to take the type of risks they took. In hindsight, it
was a continuing game of Russian roulette and ultimately the odds
caught up. We do not know whether universal banks will voluntarily
divest their investment banking operations. My guess: probably not.
Investment banking is an alluring activity, and there may still be an
appeal of cross-selling financial products under a one-firm umbrella.
In any event, it seems that the genie is out of the bottle. Investment
I
banking is no longer the prime domain of American firms, and the
financial market is truly globalized. We can only better regulate the
risk-taking activities.
My hope is that, from the ashes of the 1990s and the financial
crisis of 2008 Wall Street, will come a different business model.
Market forces have brought down an industry of titanic scale, and
Wall Street is certainly far smaller now than it was just a year ago.
There is no longer a glut of capital in search of returns (indeed we have
the opposite problem in that capital is seeking shelter from risk). In
life as in fashion, what was once old is sometimes the "new" new. A
possible future of investment banking may be a return to the old
model of focusing on intermediation services, high profitability
products, measured risk taking, and a renewed appreciation that
capital is the lifeblood of a firm and it
cannot be so easily staked. In any event,
the crisis does not mark the death of Wall
Street, or capitalism for that matter, but
only its transformation into a new form.
MY HOPE IS THAT, from the ashes of the 1990S
and the financial crisis of 2008 Wall Street, will
come a different business model.
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